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DAVID REISS* 
INTRODUCTION 
For a large part of the twentieth century, the absence of stable 
financing has caused difficulties for owners of small, urban, multi­
family buildings.1  Toward the end of the twentieth century, the sec­
ondary market for multifamily mortgages matured, which has 
increased to some extent the availability of credit for small-apart­
ment-building owners.2  At the same time, the small-apartment­
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  This Article was presented at West­
ern New England College School of Law’s 2008 “Entrepreneurship in a Global Econ­
omy” Conference.  I would like to thank Stacy Caplow, Arlo Chase, Nestor Davidson, 
Steven Dean, and Ken Levy, as well as participants in a Brooklyn Law School faculty 
workshop, for helpful comments.  I would also like to thank Jason Gang, William Gar­
rett, and Philip Tucker for superb research assistance.  The author also acknowledges 
the support of the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend Program.  Finally, I 
would like to thank the staff of the Brooklyn Law School library for help locating a 
variety of difficult-to-find sources. 
1. See, e.g., GEORGE  STERNLIEB, THE  TENEMENT  LANDLORD 196-202 (1966) 
(calling for, among other things, longer term mortgage money in order to stabilize ur­
ban tenement buildings).  Unless otherwise noted, I use the term “multifamily housing” 
to refer to buildings containing more than four units.  This distinction is necessary be­
cause, historically, the Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac 
refer to buildings with five or more units as “multifamily” and grouped two- to four-unit 
buildings with single-family homes.  William Apgar & Shekar Narasimhan, Enhancing 
Access to Capital for Smaller Unsubsidized Multifamily Rental Properties 1 (Joint Ctr. 
for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-8, 2007), available at http:// 
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr07­
8_apgar.pdf.  Where noted, I may refer to buildings with two- to four-units as multifam­
ily as well. See Emily N. Zietz, Multifamily Housing: A Review of Theory and Evidence, 
25 J. REAL  EST. RES. 185, 186 (2003) (cataloging various definitions of “multifamily 
housing”). 
2. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Meeting Multifamily Housing 
Finance Needs During and After the Credit Crisis: A Policy Brief 4 (2009) [hereinafter 
MEETING  MULTIFAMILY  HOUSING  FINANCE  NEEDS], available at http:// 
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/multifamily_housing_finance_needs.pdf 
(“The multifamily finance system in the United States is effective, credit-worthy, and 
915 
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building housing stock is shrinking due to abandonment, demoli­
tion, foreclosure, and other causes.3  Because small apartment 
buildings house many low-income families, scholars affiliated with 
Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies (the “Joint 
Center”) have suggested that financing costs for the owners of such 
buildings should be subsidized in order to protect this affordable 
housing stock and its occupants.  The most well-developed proposal 
arising from this sentiment is for the federal government to sponsor 
small Real Estate Investment Trusts (S-REITs) to pool ownership 
of multiple properties, which would allow small-building owners to 
accrue a number of significant government subsidies.4 
There is, however, no major market failure in the mortgage 
market for small multifamily buildings even though such mortgages 
tend to be more expensive than mortgages for large multifamily 
buildings.5  Moreover, available subsidies are likely to be used more 
efficiently if larger buildings were subsidized because the under­
writing of mortgages has high fixed costs.6  Finally, it is unclear if 
landlords will pass on a meaningful portion of the subsidy to 
tenants.  Thus, such a proposal should not be implemented. 
This Article has two goals.  First, to provide as thorough a his­
tory of the small-apartment owner and small multifamily properties 
as can be cobbled together from the existing literature.  This will fill 
the need for a comprehensive overview of this important, yet rela­
tively unexplored, portion of the housing stock.  And second, to use 
the S-REIT proposal as a lens with which to evaluate the role the 
government should play in the continued viability of this segment of 
the housing stock. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  First, it describes what little is 
known about the owners of small multifamily properties and the 
properties themselves.  Second, it describes the lending environ­
unlike the single-family system has maintained strong underwriting throughout the dec­
ade.”).  The Joint Center study focuses on the impact of the credit crisis on the multi­
family sector. See generally id.  This Article does not directly address the impact of the 
ongoing credit crisis on the multifamily housing sector.  Rather, it addresses structural 
issues that preceded—and in all likelihood will follow—the credit crisis. 
3. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL 
HOUSING: THE  KEY TO A  BALANCED  NATIONAL  POLICY 20 (2008) [hereinafter 
AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY], availa­
ble at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh08_americas_rental_housing/ 
rh08_americas_rental_housing.pdf. 
4. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. R 
5. See infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text. R 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55. R 
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ment faced by real-estate entrepreneurs over the last hundred 
years.  Finally, it concludes by arguing against proposals to imple­
ment affordable housing goals by subsidizing small-apartment­
building owners. 
I. THE SMALL-MULTIFAMILY-PROPERTY OWNER AND THE
 
SMALL MULTIFAMILY PROPERTY
 
Owners of small, urban, multifamily buildings are often 
thought of as “slumlords.”  George Sternlieb and Robert Burchell 
challenged the image of the “slumlord” as the most appropriate one 
to describe the typical small-time landlord.7  This is because the 
small-apartment-building owner is not a homogenous category. 
While the category does include the archetypical slumlord, it also 
includes the occupant-owner of a very small multi-unit building; the 
amateur real-estate investor who invests excess capital in a tax-
advantaged real-estate transaction; the realtor or other real-estate 
professional whose business expands to include management and 
ownership of real estate; the first-generation immigrant looking to 
enter the middle class through ownership of real estate; the absen­
tee, and typically passive, investor; as well as the speculator.8  And 
indeed, as the vitality of cities has increased from the mid-twentieth 
century to the early twenty-first century, the “slumlord” has begun 
7. GEORGE STERNLIEB & ROBERT W. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: 
THE TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED 54 (1973); see also LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GOV­
ERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 39 (1968) (arguing that 
the “tenement house movement helped fix [the slumlord] in his permanent position as 
an American devil and scapegoat”); Michael A. Stegman, Slumlords and Public Policy, 
33 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 419, 421 (1967) (stating that George Sternlieb helps “dispel[ ] the 
myth of slumlords as a monolithic group of misanthropes who derive their livelihoods in 
units of human suffering rather than in dollars of rental receipts”). 
8. See MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, HOUSING  INVESTMENT IN THE  INNER  CITY: THE 
DYNAMICS OF  DECLINE 27 (1972) (finding a similarly diverse group of landlords, al­
though with greater concentration of ownership among real-estate professionals, in 
study of Baltimore); STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 121-84 (describing many types of R 
multifamily-building owners found in his study of Newark); see also FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 7 (reviewing studies from multiple jurisdictions that demonstrated that many slum R 
landlords lived in or near their properties); Alan Mallach, Landlords at the Margins: 
Exploring the Dynamics of the One to Four Unit Rental Housing Industry 23 (Joint 
Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-15, 2007), available at http:// 
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/rr07­
15_mallach.pdf (arguing that in “the final analysis, there is no such thing as a typical 
owner” of one- to four-unit properties).  Another often overlooked type of owner is the 
“inadvertent” landlord who had initially purchased the rental building (often a single-
family) as her primary residence, only to move on to another property while retaining 
the first as an investment. Id. at 27-28. 
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to give way to the “urban pioneer” as a prevailing image we have of 
the owner of small, urban rental properties.9 
There are few facts that we know about these landlords in gen­
eral (a category that also includes owners of single-unit rental 
properties).10  Indeed, the absolute breadth of the “landlord” class 
seems to bear out the fact that no one stereotype can capture the 
9. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 53 (describing the folk figure of 
the slumlord as an “overfed individual” who is “securing a more than adequate return 
on his properties”).  In the popular imagination, rental housing is most often located in 
urban areas.  And, indeed, the facts bear this out: more than half of all rental units are 
located within ten miles of the central business districts of the ninety-one largest metro 
regions in the country. JOINT  CTR. FOR  HOUS. STUDIES OF  HARVARD  UNIV., THE 
STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 22 (2006) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING (2006)], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son 
2006/son2006.pdf.  Moreover, California, Florida, New York, and Texas, the four most 
populous states, “account for 41 percent of multifamily properties and 42 percent of 
multifamily units.”  Amy S. Bogdon & James R. Follain, Multifamily Housing: An Ex­
ploratory Analysis Using the 1991 Residential Finance Survey, 7 J. HOUSING RES. 79, 84 
(1996).  The “urban pioneer” is a bit of catchall slang for those who choose to move to 
“transitional areas.”  See MICH. DEP’T OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2005 COOL CIT­
IES GRANTS & PLANNING PROGRAMS PRE-BID WORKSHOP FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES­
TIONS 1 (2005) (on file with author), defining “urban pioneer” as 
a person who had vision for a blighted urban area who moved into the area 
and worked to restore the neighborhood.  We now think of the term to de­
scribe anyone who lives in an urban neighborhood or moves to an urban 
neighborhood to either restore or maintain it.  Some of those urban pioneers 
are empty nesters, young knowledge workers, developers, immigrants, creative 
workforce, or persons with passion for their city who believe in building or 
rebuilding a vibrant community.  No matter what age a person is, one who 
moves into a transitional area to be part of the rebirth of that neighborhood. 
An urban pioneer can also be a developer who is investing in the 
neighborhood. 
Id. 
10. There is really a surprising lack of research in this area, a problem that goes 
back quite far into the twentieth century. See, e.g., J. E. MORTON, URBAN MORTGAGE 
LENDING: COMPARATIVE MARKETS AND EXPERIENCE 16 (1956) (noting that it is typi­
cally impossible to disaggregate multifamily finance data from commercial and indus­
trial finance data); Arthur D. Sporn, Empirical Studies in the Economics of Slum 
Ownership, 36 LAND  ECON. 333, 333 (1960) (“[S]eriously documented studies of the 
economics of owning and renting substandard housing are rare.”); see also James R. 
Follain, Some Possible Directions for Research on Multifamily Housing, 5 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE, 533, 543 (1994) (noting that academic literature on multifamily housing 
and multifamily housing finance is scarce); Kerry D. Vandell, Multifamily Finance: A 
Pathway to Housing Goals, a Bridge to Commercial Mortgage Market Efficiency, 11 J. 
HOUSING RES. 319, 320 (2000) (noting that there is less data available on conditions in 
the multifamily market than on the single-family market); cf. COMMUNITY  HOUSING 
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM [CHIP], PHASE 2 STUDY: EXPANDED SURVEY OF OWNERS OF 
RENT  STABILIZED  PROPERTY 14 (2009) (report prepared by Urbanomics, on file with 
author) (noting that “[r]elatively little data has been collected on individual owners of 
rent stabilized properties throughout [New York] City” and that the present study only 
represents the “[Rent Stabilization Association] certified member universe”). 
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entirety: some 4.3 million households reported earning rental in­
come from a second property (not necessarily multifamily) in the 
2001 Residential Finance Survey.11  The survey also found that indi­
viduals and married couples owned 19.3 million rental units, includ­
ing eighty-four percent of one- to four-unit properties and sixty-five 
percent of five- to nineteen-unit properties.12  These owners tend, 
unsurprisingly, to be older and wealthier than the general popula­
tion at large,13 although a surprisingly large number of owners are 
low-income themselves.14 
Small “multifamily rentals are likely to be owned by individu­
als with few property holdings.”15  Owners of smaller properties 
typically manage their properties themselves in order to save on the 
11. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 23.  Of the 4.3 R 
million who earn rental income, 3.4 million report owning only one rental property and 
at least one third of that 3.4 million own a single-family rental unit. Id.  The 2001 Resi­
dential Finance Survey is part of the decennial U.S. Census. See Residential Finance 
Survey—Overview, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/rfs/overview.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2010).  It should be noted that there are few sources of data about landlords that 
are regularly updated.  As such, this Article will make reference to various studies from 
the last twenty years.  The reader should rely on the older studies with care, as the 
multifamily market has changed significantly during that period. 
12. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA­
TION’S HOUSING 21 (2007) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2007)], 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf. 
Business organizations and other institutions owned 15.6 million rental units. Id.; JOINT 
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES 
FOR A DIVERSE NATION 22 (2006) [hereinafter AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES 
FOR A  DIVERSE  NATION], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/ 
rh06_americas_rental_housing.pdf (“According to the Property Owners and Managers 
Survey (POMS)—perhaps the most comprehensive look at owner characteristics—most 
individuals have fewer than ten rental units, and many have just one.”).  For a thorough 
study of the one- to four-family housing stock, see Mallach, supra note 8.  Mallach finds R 
that “[n]early half of all owners of single family detached rental properties own only a 
single property, with another quarter owning two to four properties, while 70 percent of 
the owners of two-family rental properties own either one or two properties.” Id. at 19. 
Individuals and couples own in excess of eighty percent of all one- to four-family rental 
units. Id. at 20; see also LENORE SCHLOMING & SKIP SCHLOMING, THE ROAD HOME: 
WORKING WITH SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS TO PRESERVE AND CREATE AFFORDABLE 
RENTAL  HOUSING, available at http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/pdf/bgc_roadhome.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
13. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 21. R 
14. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA­
TION’S HOUSING 23 (2002) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002)], 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/Son2002.pdf (“Many 
nonresident owners of nine or fewer rental units have low incomes themselves, with 
almost a third reporting annual incomes of under $30,000.”). 
15. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA­
TION’S HOUSING 21 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2001)], 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/SON2001.pdf. 
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fees that would have to be paid to a professional manager.16  That 
being said, for most of these owners, managing their properties is at 
most a part-time job.17  Not infrequently, they reside in their 
properties.18 
There is also some useful data about smaller multifamily 
properties themselves, as distinct from the owners of such proper­
ties.19  These smaller properties make up a large share of the multi­
family market: buildings with fewer than fifty units make up 88.5% 
of multifamily properties, and those with fewer than twenty units 
make up 74.9% of multifamily properties.20  While small buildings 
make up the bulk of all multifamily buildings, they make up a much 
smaller portion of total multifamily units: only about one-third of 
multifamily rental units are in five- to forty-nine-unit buildings.21 
Small rental properties tend to be significantly older than 
larger ones.  Older properties tend to be in poorer condition and 
are thus typically more expensive to maintain, with the cost com­
pounded by the fact that they typically house lower-income re­
sidents.22  Of course, such tenants are less able to pay increased rent 
16. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 24. R 
17. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; see also R 
MALLACH, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that about three-fourths of owners of one- to R 
four-family rental units work in a field unrelated to property ownership and only a 
handful of such owners earn all of their income from property ownership).  A recent 
Joint Center paper argues for experimentation with ownership models for smaller 
properties as owners of such properties face a host of problems with them. Revisiting 
Rental Housing Policy: Observations from a National Summit 17 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. 
Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W07-2, 2007), available at http:// 
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/w07-2_revisit 
ing_rental_policy_brief.pdf [hereinafter Revisiting Rental Housing Policy]. 
18. THE  STATE OF THE  NATION’S  HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (using R 
1997 data). 
19. For a brief history of the multifamily housing stock, see ADRIENNE SCHMITZ 
ET AL., MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 8-16 (2000). 
20. CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, ABT  ASSOCS. INC., AN  ASSESSMENT OF THE 
AVAILABILITY AND  COST OF  FINANCING FOR  SMALL  MULTIFAMILY  PROPERTIES  5 
(2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/smallmultifamily.pdf (us­
ing data from HUD PROPERTY  OWNERS AND  MANAGERS  SURVEY (1996), http:// 
www.huduser.org/DATASETS/poms.html). 
21. MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 7. R 
22. See THE  STATE OF THE  NATION’S  HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 22-23; R 
Jack Goodman, Determinants of Operating Costs of Multifamily Rental Housing 20 
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W04-7, 2004), avail­
able at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-7.pdf (estimating that 
utility costs are fifty-five percent less at properties built in 1990s than for similar proper­
ties built in 1970s); see also Ann B. Schnare, The Impact of Changes in Multifamily 
Housing Finance on Older Urban Areas 4 (Brookings Inst., Ctr. on Urban and Metro. 
Policy & Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., 2001), available at http:// 
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for improved maintenance.  The units in this sector thus tend to be 
more affordable than units in larger buildings; this affordability is 
not surprising given their condition.23  Small multifamily properties 
themselves are disproportionately located in communities with 
lower-income residents, higher poverty rates, and lower homeown­
ership rates.24  This combination of higher operating costs and 
lower rents makes smaller multifamily buildings a less attractive in­
vestment opportunity, all other things being equal. 
The small multifamily subsector offers opportunities to bur­
geoning entrepreneurs but also carries great risks.25  As the Joint 
Center has noted, many of these units are “owned by individuals 
with limited capacity to maintain and manage rental properties. 
Moreover, even the most sophisticated owners of smaller rental 
properties find it difficult to secure funds to maintain or upgrade 
their units.”26 
As a result, “[f]or many of these landlords, the ventures are 
unprofitable: in 1995, thirty-two percent of owners with fewer than 
10 units reported losses on their investments.”27  Given all of this 
www.brookings.edu/es/urban/schnarefinal.pdf (noting that households living in the mul­
tifamily housing stock tend to be younger and poorer “than the average American 
household”).  For a discussion of the characteristics of the middle market for rentals, 
see JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MIDDLE MARKET RENTALS: 
HIDING IN  PLAIN  SIGHT (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/ 
markets/mmr04-1_middle_market_rentals.pdf. 
23. See THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; Wil­
liam Segal, Segmentation in the Multifamily Mortgage Market: Evidence from the Resi­
dential Finance Survey, 13 J. HOUSING  RES. 175, 178 (2003).  The Bureau of the 
Census’s 1991 Survey of Residential Finance found that rents in five- to forty-nine-unit 
properties were eighty-four percent of rents in larger properties. HERBERT, supra note 
20, at 1. R 
24. Bogdon & Follain, supra note 9, at 114. R 
25. Owner-occupants of two- to four-unit buildings are more likely to be “urban, 
blue-collar, and less affluent than single-family homeowners.” See Mallach, supra note 
8, at 21.  They are also more likely to be people of color. Id. R 
26. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23. R 
27. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2001), supra note 15, at 21; see also R 
Amy S. Bogdon & David C. Ling, The Effects of Property, Owner, Location and Tenant 
Characteristics on Multifamily Profitability, 9 J. HOUSING RES. 285, 314 (1998) (a study 
of multifamily properties, finding that “[p]roperties held by nonprofits and corporations 
are less profitable, all else equal, than those held by other ownership structures”). 
Owner-occupiers, however, have fewer losses, with only fourteen percent of them re­
porting losses in 1995. Id.  The Joint Center analysis does not appear to take into ac­
count the extent to which some investors purchase property with the express intent of 
incurring operating losses to offset current income and with the hope of future capital 
gains. See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES 66 (1972) (noting that ma­
jor tax benefits available to owners of rental property is depreciation deduction in ex­
cess of actual decrease in fair market value); Kathy M. Kristof, A Primer on Real Estate 
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bad news about owning rental units, it comes as no surprise that 
well over half of small nonresident owners would not have pur­
chased their properties if they could do it all over again.28  Notwith­
standing this state of affairs, landlords of small rental properties 
also tend to hold them for a long time, although the speculation 
that was rampant in the early 2000s may have altered this pattern.29 
While it is unlikely that many small-apartment-building owners 
purchase buildings in order to provide affordable housing to low-
and moderate-income people, policymakers and affordable-housing 
advocates have identified such owners as key players in affordable-
housing policy.  Indeed, the Joint Center writes that the “fate of the 
affordable housing supply . . . relies critically on finding ways to 
assist these small property owners in preserving rental buildings.”30 
Because of fixed transaction costs, however, it is more expensive on 
a per-unit basis—thus much less common—to subsidize owners of 
smaller multifamily properties as opposed to owners of larger mul­
tifamily properties.31  The Joint Center’s William Apgar and Shekar 
Narasimhan argue that because new production is directed at larger 
buildings, small multifamily buildings are “at risk of loss to disin­
vestment, demolition and abandonment.”32 
Tax Breaks, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at U9 (“[D]epreciation expenses frequently re­
flect phantom costs that can be used to shelter otherwise taxable income.”); see also 
ANTHONY  DOWNS, RENTAL  HOUSING IN THE 1980’S 48-49 (1983) (describing tax-
advantaged status in the early 1980s of real-estate investments over alternate 
investments). 
28. THE  STATE OF THE  NATION’S  HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23.  One R 
imagines that this figure has only increased during the Great Recession. 
29. See Mallach, supra note 8, at 22 (finding that the typical owner of one- to R 
four-unit properties in 2001 has owned property for nine years); see also STERNLIEB & 
BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 55 (finding that nearly forty percent of buildings in a study R 
of Newark “have been in the same hands for eleven or more years”). 
30. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2007), supra note 12, at 22.  This is R 
an issue that disparately impacts communities of color. Id.  In 2005, the minority share 
of renter households was forty-three percent and growing. Id. 
31. THE  STATE OF THE  NATION’S  HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23 (noting R 
that “major supply-side housing assistance programs—including the Low-Income Hous­
ing Tax Credit—typically provide subsidies to larger properties, even though most rent­
ers needing assistance live in smaller properties”); Donald S. Bradley et al., An 
Examination of Mortgage Debt Characteristics and Financial Risk Among Multifamily 
Properties, 10 J. HOUSING. ECON. 482, 487 (2001) (noting that smaller properties “are 
also less likely to receive direct government assistance, including Section 8, the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit, government grants and/or property tax relief” and that 
“[o]nly thirty-four percent of small properties reported that they receive some type of 
government assistance, compared to fifty-six percent of large developments”). 
32. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 3; see also Stegman, supra note 7, at R 
419 (“While national policy is committed to the goal of providing every American fam­
ily with a decent home, one extremely scarce housing resource, the low-rent sector of 
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SMALL MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE
 
FINANCE
 
Loan underwriting had historically been a very local activity, 
one that was based on a careful evaluation of an individual’s finan­
cial prospects, reliability, and place within the community.  Local 
thrifts, in particular, were very active in small multifamily lending, 
until the savings-and-loan crisis and the real-estate downturn of the 
1980s reduced their activity in this area.33  Since the 1980s, however, 
there has been a great change in multifamily property finance as the 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) industry took off. 
This movement from local to global mortgage funding had a 
profound impact on the financing options available for small multi­
family properties. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, entrepreneurs, par­
ticularly those who were different in some way (real or perceived) 
from their local bankers, faced great difficulty in obtaining financ­
ing from their local banks.34  This difficulty was intensified in inner-
city areas.35  In the absence of financing from established lenders, 
more sympathetic savings and loans arose in established immigrant 
communities.36  Borrowers also turned to informal lenders who 
would lend within a particular ethnic group.37  These so-called “im­
migrant lenders” gave “many simple shopkeepers and small-scale 
entrepreneurs ready access to large pools of capital and . . . they 
the privately owned housing inventory, is being squandered.”).  Apgar and 
Narasimhan’s point applies just as much to housing preservation efforts to the extent 
that they too focus on large projects. 
33. See Denise DiPasquale & Jean L. Cummings, Financing Multifamily Rental 
Housing: The Changing Role of Lenders and Investors, 3 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 77, 
78 (1992); James R. Follain & Edward J. Szymanoski, A Framework for Evaluating 
Government’s Evolving Role in Multifamily Mortgage Markets, 1 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y 
DEV. & RES. 151, 151-52 (1995); see also Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 7 R 
(“Indeed, by 2001, S&Ls provided just 17.2 percent of financing to properties with 5 to 
49 units, compared to 36.9 percent in 1991.”). 
34. Jared N. Day, Credit, Capital and Community: Informal Banking in Immigrant 
Communities in the United States, 1880–1924, 9 FIN. HIST. REV. 65, 65 (2002) (noting 
that immigrants were not usually welcomed at traditional banks); see also SAM B. 
WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON, 1870-1900, 
at 117-24 (1961) (describing typically complex financing of residential projects in late 
nineteenth century). 
35. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 196. 
36. DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831-1995, at 54-56 (2004). 
37. Day, supra note 34, at 65.  Indeed, Henry, Emmanuel, and Mayer Lehman R 
began in the informal immigrant banking world before founding Lehman Brothers, as 
did A.P. Giannini, the founder of Bank of America. Id. at 77. 
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overwhelmingly invested these funds in local real estate either as 
unlicensed lenders or as direct builders and purchasers.”38  Because 
of the lack of access to traditional lenders, immigrant lenders be­
came “critical sources of capital for local real estate investment.”39 
Starting around World War I, the role of the immigrant lender 
in multifamily investment began to be displaced by competition 
from insurance and title companies, as well as other lenders.40  And 
over the course of the Great Depression, with its concomitant wave 
of foreclosures, many landlords lost their buildings.41  These trends 
initiated the professionalization of the multifamily real-estate in­
dustry, as many individual owners were shaken out, one way or an­
other.42  This trend continued in the Post-War period, accompanied 
by more and more government involvement in multifamily 
finance.43 
Another significant ownership trend developed in the 1960s, 
whereby many African Americans purchased central-city, multi­
family properties and used the housing for residential as well as in­
come purposes.44  This trend was accompanied by the widespread 
abandonment of central-city housing by many absentee owners in 
the 1960s and 1970s as buildings stopped producing sufficient in­
38. JARED N. DAY, URBAN  CASTLES 40 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1999).  One 
1920 federal report observed that “real estate, first and second mortgages, and specula­
tive securities were favored forms of investment.  Such holdings are almost uniformly 
the heaviest assets of the [immigrant] banker.” Id. at 40-41; see LOUIS  WINNICK, 
RENTAL HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 159 (1958). 
Frequently the small investor of past decades was a modest businessman or
 
even a worker, often of foreign heritage, who regarded the purchase of a new
 
residential property from his lifetime savings as providing not only a place to
 
live, but also added personal status, a retirement income, and, with luck and
 
rising prices, an estate for his children.
 
Id.; STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 41 (“Many of the smaller landlords are first-generation R 
Americans . . . .”). 
39. DAY, supra note 38, at 41 (“[E]vidence suggests that the overall volume of R 
[immigrant lenders’] economic activity may have been staggering.”). 
40. Id. (noting that regulation drove out some immigrant lenders); see Donald S. 
Bradley et al., Financing Multifamily Properties: A Play with New Actors and New 
Lines, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 5, 11 (1998) (discussing the developing role 
of insurers and other new players in the multifamily mortgage market). 
41. DAY, supra note 38, at 176-177. 
42. Id.  Louis Winnick noted that one estimate in the 1950s found that “the pro­
portion of apartment mortgage debt held by institutional lenders rose from about 50 
[percent] at the end of the twenties to 80 [percent] in the mid-fifties.” WINNICK, supra 
note 38, at 160. 
43. See MORTON, supra note 10, at 48-70 (providing detailed history of growth R 
and structure of lending industry through early 1950s); WINNICK, supra note 38, at 155. R 
44. STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 97. R 
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come even to cover the basic costs of taxes and utilities, let alone 
insurance, financing, and maintenance expenses.45  As many cities 
became unstable in the 1960s, private lenders became scarce in the 
multifamily market.46  Even after cities recovered from the aban­
donment crisis, the multifamily market continued with a cycle of 
booms and busts—most notably the late-1980s to early-1990s bust 
and the late-1990s and early-2000s boom—followed by the bust in 
which we now find ourselves.47 
Historically, the available private-sector lending was unattrac­
tive from the multi-unit landlord’s perspective.48  Throughout much 
of the twentieth century, private multifamily mortgages had been 
short term, requiring a borrower to refinance frequently and face 
the risk that the interest-rate environment might become unfavora­
ble.49  Such an unstable lending environment can lead to a de­
pressed real-estate market as owners lose faith in their ability to sell 
45. See, e.g., STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 269-352 (studying aban­
donment in Newark); THE  NEW  YORK  CITY  RAND  INSTITUTE, RENTAL  HOUSING IN 
NEW YORK CITY 9-11 (Ira S. Lowry ed., 1970) [hereinafter RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW 
YORK CITY]; David J. Reiss, Housing Abandonment and New York City’s Response, 22 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 783 (1996).  The abandonment crisis was most severe 
in the East, as broad demographic changes drove jobs and people to other parts of the 
country. See Harold L. Bunce & Sue G. Neal, Trends in City Conditions During the 
1970s: A Survey of Demographic and Socioeconomic Changes, 14 PUBLIUS 7, 8-10 
(1984). 
46. See, e.g., STEGMAN, supra note 8, at 197 (“In Baltimore, too, the absence of R 
mortgage capital is a critical factor in the declining inner-city market . . . .”); STERNLIEB 
& BURCHELL, supra note 7, at xxv (“Primary lenders in urban areas—commercial and R 
mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and even 
individuals—are getting out of the inner city mortgage lending business.  They are re­
placed by mortgage companies which deal almost exclusively in insured loans.”); see 
also RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 45, at 9 (“[I]nstitutional inves- R 
tors are, as rapidly as possible, reducing their portfolios of controlled housing and of 
housing in deteriorated neighborhoods.”). 
47. Lawrence Goldberg & Charles A. Capone, Jr., Multifamily Mortgage Credit 
Risk: Lessons from Recent History, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 93, 95 (1998) 
(discussing tax and accounting aspects of booms and busts of 1980s-2000s); Segal, supra 
note 23, at 178 (discussing the 1980s and 1990s bust); Prabha Natarajan, Real-Estate R 
Finance: Apartments Try to Stay Afloat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009, at C11 (reporting on 
rising mortgage defaults for multifamily properties). 
48. See STERNLIEB & BURCHELL, supra note 7, at 237.  The authors note, R 
The availability of institutional financing is one of the major determinants of 
the health and vitality of the real estate market.  If the banks, savings and loan 
companies, insurance companies, and the like are willing to lend in an area, 
then owners can have confidence that their investments in properties are re­
deemable through ultimate resale or remortgaging.
 
Id. 
49. GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL HOUS­
ING 89 (1981). 
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their property because potential buyers are unable to arrange for 
financing.50 
Owners of smaller multifamily properties seem to find their fi­
nancing options even less attractive, as seen from the fact that such 
buildings are mortgaged less often than larger multifamily proper­
ties.51  Mortgages secured by smaller properties also tend to have 
higher interest rates,52 and they have adjustable interest rates more 
frequently than mortgages secured by larger properties; this ex­
poses them to interest-rate risk.53 
One major reason for the different mortgage terms for small 
and large properties is that the underwriting of any commercial 
mortgage is associated with significant fixed costs.54  These under­
writing costs, payable to third-party providers, can exceed $10,000 
50. Id. at 87-89. 
51. Segal, supra note 23, at 179-80 (noting that owners of smaller buildings are R 
more likely to rely on relational financing from depository institutions).  The lower rate 
of mortgages for smaller buildings may also be explained in part by the fact that smaller 
buildings are easier to buy in an all-cash transaction and that smaller mortgages can be 
paid in full more easily.  Finally, it is unclear what the socially optimal rate of financing 
for multifamily buildings is, so it may or may not be that the lower proportion of mort­
gages for smaller buildings is actually undesirable.  That being said, many of the com­
mentators discussed herein take the position that the small multifamily sector has a 
more difficult time obtaining financing than other sectors of the mortgage market. 
52. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13.  Small multifamily properties also tend to pay R 
significantly higher mortgage rates.  Bradley, supra note 31, at 502 (estimating that rates R 
on small properties are about 100 basis points higher than rates on large developments); 
see also Drew Schneider & James Follain, A New Initiative in the Federal Housing Ad­
ministration’s Office of Multifamily Housing Programs: An Assessment of Small Projects 
Processing, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y  DEV. & RES. 43, 49 (1998) (noting that, in some 
cases, smaller multifamily mortgages are as much as 300 basis points higher). 
53. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 13-14.  Interest-rate risk is the risk that the pay- R 
ments a company owes on short-term debt that funds purchases become mismatched 
with the interest payments it receives in turn from its long-term investments.  David 
Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac’s 
Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2008). 
54. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50; see also HERBERT, supra note R 
20, at iv (arguing that higher interest rates reflect the need to amortize fixed costs over R 
the life of the loan, the reduced competition in the market segment, and the lack of 
sophistication of the borrowers in that segment).  Commercial mortgage underwriting 
primarily focuses on the ability of the property to cover its monthly expenses and its 
monthly mortgage expenses in particular.  By way of contrast, residential mortgage un­
derwriting focuses on whether the borrower has the capacity to repay the loan. 
A recent study of community bank underwriting suggests that the use of consumer 
credit scores for owners of small businesses—as opposed to reliance on best estimates 
of the creditworthiness of the small business itself—may prove a way to expand credit 
without increasing credit risk. See Allen N. Berger et al., The Surprising Use of Credit 
Scoring in Small Business Lending by Community Banks and the Attendant Effects on 
Credit Availability and Risk 1-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2009-9, 
2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0909.pdf. 
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and typically include charges for appraisals, environmental reviews, 
and attorney certifications.55  Because the small-apartment-building 
lender has to recoup those costs from a smaller principal base, there 
will be higher upfront fees or a higher interest rate, which will allow 
the lender to amortize those fixed costs over time.56 
As a result of the unattractive terms available in the private, 
multifamily mortgage market generally, the government sector has 
sought to expand financing options.57  Various government pro­
grams stepped in to provide more stable lending to such borrowers, 
including the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as 
state- and government-sponsored enterprise programs.58  Because 
of the high fixed costs associated with originating and servicing such 
loans, however, these government programs faced similar con­
straints as private lenders.  As a result, these multifamily mortgage 
programs also have historically poorly served the smaller multi­
family subsector. 
A variety of FHA programs provided mortgages, either di­
rectly or indirectly, for multifamily properties.59  The market pene­
tration of these programs has waxed and waned with changes in the 
market and the political environment.60  FHA programs, however, 
have been frequently criticized for their high interest rates, slow 
approval processes, overly strict underwriting criteria, and rela­
tively short (five-year) terms.61  Over time, the FHA has also 
55. See HERBERT, supra note 20, at 15-16. 
56. See Bradley et al., supra note 40, at 15 (noting that the fixed costs of loan R 
review “increase as a percentage of loan balance as loan size decreases”). 
57. See STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 49, at 91 (noting that the government R 
sector had become a dominant lender in the multifamily sector even though it imposes 
some terms that landlords find onerous). 
58. See id. at 89-91. 
59. The FHA provides for mortgages indirectly by offering mortgage insurance to 
lenders that insures against losses incurred when borrowers default. ALEX F. 
SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (2006) (discussing various 
FHA programs); EDWARD J. SZYMANOSKI & SUSAN J. DONAHUE, DO FHA MULTI­
FAMILY  MORTGAGE  INSURANCE  PROGRAMS  PROVIDE  AFFORDABLE  HOUSING AND 
SERVE UNDERSERVED AREAS? 6 (1999); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Descrip­
tions of Multifamily Programs, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/mfh/progdesc/ 
progdesc.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing FHA mortgage insurance origination 
programs). 
60. Vandell, supra note 10, at 323 (noting that “[b]y 1993, FHA was virtually out R 
of the multifamily business, making up only 6 percent of multifamily starts”). 
61. See, e.g., STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 186-87, 192-96; WINNICK, supra note 38, R 
at 171; Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 152-53 (discussing the “litany of R 
problems” with the FHA).  The FHA responds to these criticisms on its website.  FHA 
Website, Dispelling Common Myths About Participating with FHA (on file with au­
thor).  For a history of the early FHA, seen from a planning perspective, see MARK A. 
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tended to provide financing for larger buildings as well, in part be­
cause of the efficiencies presented by larger projects.62  This was 
compounded by the fact that owners of smaller properties were 
often less likely to know about and access such government pro­
grams because of lack of knowledge about, experience with, and 
expertise with them.63 
Many states have housing finance agencies that provide low-
interest loans and long terms in exchange for caps on rents.64  How­
ever, these programs also tend to favor larger projects, because, 
again, of the fixed costs associated with them.65  Other state-
government programs directed at property owners are also less 
often accessed by owners of smaller multifamily properties.66 
The federal government has not taken a strong lead in support­
ing small multifamily finance as compared to other mortgage sub­
sectors.67  The Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly 
known as “Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (commonly known as “Freddie Mac”), the two govern­
ment-sponsored enterprises that dominate the conforming residen­
tial (owner-occupied) mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market, 
first entered the multifamily market in a significant way in the 
WEISS, THE  RISE OF THE  COMMUNITY  BUILDERS: THE  AMERICAN  REAL  ESTATE  IN­
DUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING 141-158 (1987). 
62. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189 (noting that fixed costs could be spread R 
over more units in larger buildings); Segal, supra note 23, at 189 (noting that the pro- R 
portion of small-multifamily mortgages insured by the FHA fell from 39.4% in 1989 to 
1.9% in 2002).  In 1997, the FHA announced its Small Projects Processing Program, 
which was intended to reach the small-project market that had been marginalized in 
earlier FHA programs. Id.; see also Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 48 (finding R 
that the FHA’s standard multifamily programs “are prohibitive for financing small 
projects”).  Vandell does note, however, that the FHA has focused on smaller projects 
at various times in its history.  Vandell, supra note 10, at 324 (noting that FHA’s post- R 
war focus was on smaller projects). 
63. See STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 189. R 
64. See National Council of State Housing Agencies, HFA Directory, http:// 
www.ncsha.org/housing-help (last visited Apr. 27, 2010). 
65. Schnare, supra note 22, at 21-22 (citing Bradley, supra note 31); see also JUS- R 
TIN COOPER, MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING: FINANCING WITH TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 
21 (2003) (noting that because the costs of offering tax-exempt bonds “to the public are 
largely fixed, but project sizes and costs vary widely, some transactions are too small to 
justify the cost of a public offering”). 
66. Bradley, supra note 31, at 487. 
67. See MEETING  MULTIFAMILY  HOUSING  FINANCE  NEEDS, supra note 2, at iv. R 
For a list of federal multifamily finance programs, see SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 19, at R 
160.  In a 1992 study prepared for HUD, researchers found that ten percent of all units 
in HUD-insured multifamily housing properties were in buildings with fewer than fifty 
units. JAMES E. WALLACE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF THE HUD-INSURED MULTIFAMILY 
HOUSING STOCK 2-4 (1992). 
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1990s.68  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have, however, had limited 
exposure to the small multifamily sector, tending to put their re­
sources in the large multifamily sector.69  This is partly because 
their underwriting and servicing standards often are uneconomical 
or too stringent for smaller buildings and their owners.70 
Starting in the early 1990s, a vibrant, private, secondary mort­
gage market for multifamily housing mortgages also developed.71 
At that time, the Wall Street firms developed so-called “private­
label” CMBS which included multifamily mortgages.72  At the peak 
of the global CMBS market in 2007, there was nearly $309 billion in 
CMBS issued, of which almost $49 billion, or sixteen percent, was 
comprised of multifamily mortgages.73 
68. See generally DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33. R 
69. MEETING  MULTIFAMILY  HOUSING  FINANCE  NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4; see R 
also Frank E. Nothaft & James L. Freund, The Evolution of Securitization in Multifam­
ily Mortgage Markets and Its Effect on Lending Rates, 25 J. REAL EST. RES. 91, 91-92 
(2003) (describing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s limited exposure to multifamily sec­
tors, which “reflected the nature of the underlying multifamily loans: mortgage con­
tracts were not standardized, the collateral rental properties were heterogeneous and 
the geographic concentration of properties made multifamily lending a more risky un­
dertaking”).  As the Joint Center notes, Fannie and Freddie typically “only increased 
their focus on financing smaller (5-49 unit) multifamily rental properties temporarily 
when” doing so helped them meet the affordable housing goals set for them by Con­
gress. MEETING  MULTIFAMILY  HOUSING  FINANCE  NEEDS, supra note 2, at 7; see 
KIMBERLY  BURNETT & LINDA B. FOSBURG, STUDY OF THE  MULTIFAMILY  UNDER­
WRITING AND THE GSES’ ROLE IN THE MULTIFAMILY MARKET: EXPANDED VERSION, 
at x-xi (2001) (noting that the “GSEs’ multifamily purchases do not appear to be con­
tributing consistently to the mitigation of excessive cost of mortgage financing facing 
small properties with five to 50 units,” but also noting that HUD had implemented an 
incentive for the GSEs to become more active in this segment); see also HUD’s Regula­
tion of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044, 65,045 (Oct. 31, 2000) 
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81 (2009)) (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “have 
been much less active in purchasing mortgages in markets where there is a need for 
additional financing to address persistent housing needs including financing for small 
multifamily rental properties, manufactured housing, single family owner-occupied 
rental properties, seasoned affordable housing mortgages, and older housing in need of 
rehabilitation”). 
70. Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49. R 
71. See AMERICA’S  RENTAL  HOUSING: THE  KEY TO A  BALANCED  NATIONAL 
POLICY, supra note 3, at 14; DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33. R 
72. Kent W. Colton & Kate Collignon, Multifamily Rental Housing in the 21st 
Century 64 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W01-1, 
2001), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/colton_w01-1.pdf. 
73. COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE ALERT, GLOBAL CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2008 (2008), 
available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid=198.  Global Multifamily CMBS 
issuance grew from $9.9 billion in 2000. COMMERCIAL  MORTGAGE  ALERT, GLOBAL 
CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2001 (2001), available at http://www.cmalert.com/ranking.php?rid 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\31-3\WNE315.txt unknown Seq: 17  7-JUN-10 7:30 
930 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:915 
Securitization works best when the underlying assets are simi­
lar because such similarity reduces due diligence and other costs.74 
One of the main limitations of the multifamily CMBS market is that 
the underlying mortgages are not uniform, particularly in the case 
of smaller properties.75  This increases the transaction costs for all 
parties who must deal with them.76  Furthermore, owners of small 
properties often do not keep the kind of records that investors 
would require in order to invest in such properties, even at the 
mortgage-backed pool level.77 
The proportion of multifamily mortgages that had been securi­
tized since the early 1990s has grown steadily as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and the private-label sector has gained more experi­
ence with the CMBS market.78  In 1986, less than ten percent of 
multifamily mortgages were either held or securitized through the 
activities of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, federal agencies like Ginnie Mae, and pri­
vate securities issuers.79  Just ten years later, in 1996, this number 
had jumped to twenty-three percent.80  And in 2006, prior to the 
=170.  It has since fallen to $2.9 billion in 2008 as a result of the credit crisis. See 
GLOBAL CMBS ISSUANCE IN 2008, supra. 
74. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency 
Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 778 (2005) (“Without a standardized mortgage docu­
ment and uniform lending techniques, the secondary market never would have gotten 
off the ground.”). 
75. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S  HOUSING (2002), supra note 14, at 23; DiPas- R 
quale & Cummings, supra note 33, at 97. R 
76. DiPasquale & Cummings, supra note 33, at 97. 
77. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2. R 
78. AMERICA’S  RENTAL  HOUSING: THE  KEY TO A  BALANCED  NATIONAL  POL­
ICY, supra note 3, at 14 (“Along with increased standardization of underwriting criteria R 
and loan documentation, these trends created a larger, more stable, and less expensive 
source of capital for rental property owners and developers, while also providing 
greater diversification for investors.”). 
79. See BD. OF  GOVERNORS OF THE  FED. RESERVE  SYS., FLOW OF  FUNDS  AC­
COUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1985-1994, at 87 
tbl.L.219 [hereinafter FLOW OF  FUNDS 1985-1994], available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1985-1994.pdf.  The calculations 
in this paragraph take into account the sum of outstanding multifamily residential mort­
gage debt attributed to “Government-sponsored enterprises,” “Agency- and GSE-
backed mortgage pools,” and “ABS issuers,” as compared to the “Total Liabilities” of 
multifamily residential mortgage debt. 
80. See BD. OF  GOVERNORS OF THE  FED. RESERVE  SYS., FLOW OF  FUNDS  AC­
COUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2004, at 87 
tbl.L.219, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1995­
2004.pdf. 
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credit crisis, roughly forty-five percent of multifamily mortgages 
were sold into the secondary mortgage market.81 
However, the increase in securitization was concentrated in 
mortgages secured by large properties.82  Small multifamily mort­
gages made up significantly less than ten percent of total securitized 
multifamily volume in the late 1990s and early 2000s.83  Smaller 
loans and loans for properties with five to forty-nine units mostly 
bypass the secondary market altogether and remain in the domain 
of bank and thrift portfolio lenders.84 
81. See BD. OF  GOVERNORS OF THE  FED. RESERVE  SYS., FLOW OF  FUNDS  AC­
COUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 2005-2008, at 87 
tbls.L.218 & L.219 [hereinafter FLOW OF  FUNDS 2005-2008], available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a2005-2008.pdf.  By way of con­
trast, sixty percent of mortgages on one- to four-family properties were sold into the 
secondary mortgage market in 2006. Id.  This increase in securitization was, of course, 
at the expense of traditional players in the commercial mortgage market: the portion of 
multifamily mortgages held by commercial banks, savings institutions, and life insur­
ance companies dropped from sixty-two percent in 1986, FLOW OF  FUNDS 1985-1994, 
supra note 79, at 87 tbl.L219, to forty percent in 2006, FLOW OF  FUNDS 2005-2008, R 
supra, at 87 tbl.L.219. 
82. AMERICA’S  RENTAL  HOUSING: THE  KEY TO A  BALANCED  NATIONAL  POL­
ICY, supra note 3, at 14.  The report notes, R 
[A] dual mortgage delivery system began to emerge. Individuals and investors 
seeking to purchase, rehabilitate, or build smaller rental properties were in­
creasingly served by a distinctly different set of mortgage products, provided 
by a distinctly different set of lenders, than those financing larger rental 
properties.  The Survey of Residential Finance documents [show] that by 2001, 
some 86 percent of all apartment properties with 50 or more units had a mort­
gage, and as many as 65 percent of these properties had a level-payment, 
fixed-rate loan. In contrast, only 58 percent of five- to nine-unit apartment 
buildings had a mortgage, and just a third had level-payment, fixed-rate 
mortgages. 
Id. 
83. Segal, supra note 23, at 191.  Christopher Herbert, writing in 2001, noted that R 
only 1.8% of loans in CMBS consisted of small loans. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 14. R 
Herbert’s research suggests that the CMBS market does not offer lower interest rates; 
rather, it offers fixed-rate financing where depositories typically offer adjustable-rate 
financing. Id. at vi.  Even though Fannie and Freddie’s exposure to this submarket is 
small, it is larger than that of private label CMBS players. Id. at vii.  Other actors play a 
significant role in financing multifamily housing:  for instance, pension funds and life 
insurance companies typically finance luxury multifamily developments. MEETING 
MULTIFAMILY  HOUSING  FINANCE  NEEDS, supra note 2, at 4.  Mortgage Real Estate R 
Investment Trusts also invest in multifamily projects. SCHMITZ, MULTIFAMILY  HOUS­
ING  DEVELOPMENT  HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 156; see Vandell, supra note 10, at R 
345 (discussing limited role of mortgage REITs in multifamily finance).  I have not been 
able to find more up-to-date data for small multifamily securitization rates. 
84. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA­
TION’S HOUSING 24 (2004) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2004)], 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2004.pdf (noting that 
in 1999, “more than half of all multifamily loans financed by banks and thrifts had 
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In sum, the small multifamily subsector remains comparatively 
underserved in the secondary mortgage market as well as in the 
primary mortgage market.85  As a result, there is evidence that a 
“credit gap” has existed in parts of the multifamily mortgage mar­
ket, particularly in the five- to forty-nine-unit property sector.86 
The question remains: should the government intervene to shrink 
that gap? 
III.	 THE CASE FOR SUBSIDIZING LANDLORDS OF SMALL 
PROPERTIES HAS NOT BEEN MADE 
As leading housing scholar Stegman notes, ‘“it is obvious that 
the substantial owner of slum real estate is not in business for altru­
istic purposes’ . . . but since when is altruism a prerequisite for pro­
gress?”87  Stegman and Sternlieb argue that it may benefit society 
to help wealth-maximizing small-apartment-building owners in or­
der to ultimately assist low- and moderate-income tenants.88 
While I do not disagree with this general proposition, I believe 
that we should be certain that any aid given to landlords will actu­
ally be passed on in large part to their tenants, whether through 
lower rents or improved conditions.  As such, I question the extent 
to which the government should implement affordable housing ini­
tiatives by subsidizing small-apartment-building owners.  This ques­
tion is of pressing importance because leading housing scholars 
balances of $1 million or less, compared with about 15 percent of the multifamily loans 
financed by” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).  HUD’s 1996 Property Owners and Man­
agers Survey reveals that depositories fund about seventy percent of mortgages for 
buildings with fewer than fifty units versus forty-five percent of properties with one 
hundred or more units.  Herbert, supra note 20, at 13; see also THE  STATE OF THE R 
NATION’S HOUSING (2004), supra, at 24 (noting that because of the history of the secon­
dary mortgage market, two- to four-unit properties are more readily securitized because 
they are grouped with single-family homes in the residential mortgage market and are 
securitized as part of residential, mortgage-backed securities).  Although underwriting 
costs for small properties are proportionately higher, it appears that such properties are 
“comparable to larger multifamily properties in historical loan performance.”  Schnei­
der & Follain, supra note 52, at 49. R 
85. See HUD’s Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg. 
65,044, 65,050 (Oct. 31, 2000) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81) (“There is evidence that the 
aging stocks of single family rental properties and small multifamily properties with 5­
50 units, which play a key role in lower-income housing, have experienced difficulties in 
obtaining financing.”). 
86. William Segal & Edward J. Szymanoski, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
Multifamily Mortgage Market, 4 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 59, 65 (1998). 
87. Stegman, supra note 7, at 423 (quoting STERNLIEB, supra note 1, at 139). R 
88. See generally STERNLIEB, supra note 1; Stegman, supra note 7.	 R 
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believe that small multifamily mortgages should in fact be 
subsidized. 
Leading housing scholars have advocated for small multifamily 
mortgage subsidies for over forty years.  Michael Stegman has 
called for decreased costs for small-property owners, even while ac­
knowledging that there “is something distasteful about trying to 
rally support for a group of property owners who have been consid­
ered the natural enemy of liberal housing reformers ever since the 
industrial revolution.”89  More recently, the Joint Center, along 
with affiliated researchers, has called for Congress to expend public 
funds to develop new financing tools, including subsidies, for small, 
privately-owned apartment buildings.90 
The Joint Center’s William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan 
have presented perhaps the most well-developed subsidy proposal 
to date.91  They advocate that the federal government sponsor a 
“small Real Estate Investment Trust (S-REIT) that would aggre­
gate ownership of older, smaller multifamily properties with low or 
89. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420. 
90. See, e.g., AMERICA’S  RENTAL  HOUSING: THE  KEY TO A  BALANCED  NA­
TIONAL POLICY, supra note 3, at 20.  For example, R 
Since developing new affordable rental housing remains difficult without steep 
subsidy, preserving whatever low-cost units remain should be an urgent prior­
ity.  The success of preservation efforts depends in large measure on the will­
ingness of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to renew expiring project-
based contracts and fund additional efforts to slow the loss of privately owned 
low-cost rentals. 
Id.; see William Apgar, Rethinking Rental Housing: Expanding the Ability of Rental 
Housing to Serve as a Pathway to Economic and Social Opportunity 55 (Joint Ctr. for 
Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W04-11, 2004), available at http:// 
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-11.pdf (fleshing out a proposal for a 
trust that “could combine private capital with federal, state and local resources, while at 
the same time reducing costs associated with obtaining subsidies on a project-by-project 
basis”); Revisiting Rental Housing Policy, supra note 17, at 16 (“Some owners who are R 
interested in continuing to operate their properties as low-cost housing will need help 
with capital needs; other properties may need to be purchased to preserve affordability. 
While much is known about ways to preserve subsidized developments, preservation 
strategies for the unassisted stock have received little attention”); Stegman, supra note 
7, at 420.  Shaun Donovan, now the Secretary of HUD, has proposed subsidizing the R 
cost of underwriting, servicing, and securitization for small multifamily buildings. 
Shaun Donovan, Background Paper on Market Rate Multifamily Rental Housing 21 
(Millennial Hous. Comm’n, Fin. Task Force, 2002), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/ 
papers/mrmf.doc.  This proposal rests, it appears, on the assumption that such a subsidy 
would be a relatively efficient way to increase the supply of affordable housing. See 
Stegman, supra note 7, at 420. 
91. Despite the repeated refrain for new financing alternatives and subsidies by 
affordable-housing advocates like the Joint Center, there is surprisingly little in con­
crete proposals as to how to implement policies directing subsidies to small-building 
owners. 
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modest rents” and act as a conduit for federal subsidies.92  From 
this investment vehicle, small-multifamily-property owners would 
receive the following benefits: they would incur no capital gains tax 
on exchanging their property for a proportionate (and liquid) inter­
est in the S-REIT; they would gain access to credit at a lower price 
by means of the S-REIT’s tax-exempt bond issuing capability; and 
properties managed by the trust would be exempt from recording 
taxes and would be eligible for local tax abatements.93  Individually, 
each of these benefits would confer a significant advantage over 
owners of comparable properties; taken collectively, these benefits 
represent a substantial subsidy channeled directly to owners of 
small multifamily buildings who choose to participate in an S-REIT. 
There are two main rationales for subsidizing small-building 
landlords.  First, they provide housing to the neediest tenants: low-
and moderate-income families who are not fortunate enough to 
have obtained subsidized apartments.  Second, the multifamily 
mortgage market is subject to market failures that make govern­
ment intervention appropriate.  I will assess these two rationales in 
turn. 
A. The Affordability Rationale 
Housing economist John Quigley writes, 
“Affordability” is clearly the most compelling rationale for 
polices [sic] subsidizing rental housing.  The high cost of rental 
housing, relative to the ability of low-income households to pay 
for housing, means that these households have few resources left 
over for expenditures on other goods—food, clothing, 
medicine—which are also necessities.94 
92. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 2.  The Community Preservation Cor- R 
poration (CPC) also proposed a model of MBS that was intended to address the needs 
of smaller (six to twelve) unit buildings.  Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 168-72 R 
(evaluating the CPC proposal). 
93. Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 19-20. R 
94. John M. Quigley, Just Suppose: Housing Subsidies for Low-Income Renters 
13 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Paper No. RR07-9, 2007), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/ 
rr07-9_quigley.pdf, and reprinted in REVISITING  RENTAL  HOUSING: POLICIES, PRO­
GRAMS, AND PRIORITIES 300 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008); see Rob­
ert C. Ellickson, The Mediocrity of Government Subsidies to Mixed-Income Housing 
Projects 3 (Yale Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public 
Policy, Paper No. 360, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1217870 (“Most hous­
ing experts agree that the chief challenge today is not how to improve the quality of 
American dwellings, but how to make what’s available more affordable to households 
on a tight budget.”); Schnare, supra note 22, at 27 (“Given the relatively low incomes of R 
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Quigley’s position applies to all affordable housing subsidies. 
To make the case that it applies with special force to subsidies di­
rected at for-profit owners of small apartment buildings, one must 
argue that such actors are better at delivering affordable housing to 
at least some category of households than other actors. 
And, indeed, that argument does have some merit.  For in­
stance, if other providers of affordable housing systematically ex­
clude some low-income households, a case may be made that 
for-profit owners of small apartment buildings do play a socially 
beneficial role as landlords of last resort.  There is evidence that 
some affordable housing providers have a history of behaving in 
just this way.  Public housing authorities have at various times in 
their history effectively screened “out any prospective tenant family 
who for any reason might act irresponsibly or fail to adequately 
care for its government-owned housing unit.”95  Michael Stegman 
therefore argues that it “rests with the private landlord to provide 
such families with housing.”96  While Stegman wrote this over forty 
this nation’s renters—and the relatively high costs of operating and maintaining units— 
there is a real and unmet need for rental subsidies.”); see also Roger Starr, Private 
Ventures in Slum Building Rehabilitation for Low-Income Families, 24 J. HOUSING 32 
(1967).  Starr notes that 
it is clear that rehabilitation of old law tenements for low income families can­
not be done profitably without heavy subsidization—above and beyond low
 
interest, long term mortgages, and tax abatements.  What seems to be needed
 
are either rent supplements, which would permit realistic rent levels, or an
 
initial capital grant which would help keep rents at a level that tenants could
 
afford out of their own earnings.
 
Id., quoted in Stegman, supra note 7, at 423; WINNICK, supra note 38, at 171 (“The R 
problems and perplexities of rental housing demonstrate that some form of government 
assistance has been—and still is—an inescapable requirement for an adequate volume 
of new private investment in rental housing . . . .”). 
95. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420; SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 105 (noting that R 
during the early days of public housing, “[m]anagers conducted home visits to most 
applicants to see whether their households were sufficiently orderly to qualify for public 
housing,” and that “[m]anagers were also not shy about evicting unruly tenants or 
tenants who failed to keep their homes up to an acceptable standard of tidiness”); 
Michael H. Schill & Susan W. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and 
Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1298 (1995) 
(“In the early years of the [public housing] program, [Public Housing Authorities] had 
enormous latitude in admission and eviction decisions.  This freedom permitted [the 
housing authorities] to screen out ‘problem’ tenants and quickly evict those who cre­
ated difficulties.”); see also NICHOLAS  DAGEN  BLOOM, PUBLIC  HOUSING  THAT 
WORKED: NEW YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 (2009) (noting that the level of 
scrutiny applied to public-housing applicants waxed and waned over time and among 
jurisdictions). 
96. Stegman, supra note 7, at 420. R 
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years ago, his argument can hold true for federally assisted housing 
providers today.97 
This state of affairs is further exacerbated by the long-term dis­
investment in the nation’s stock of subsidized affordable housing. 
Since the 1980s, 
the pace of government spending in general has slowed; the 
problems in large-scale public housing projects are proving in­
tractable; the new subsidized alternative—small-scale, scattered-
site, mixed-income projects—provides housing for very few fami­
lies at an exorbitant cost. It has become apparent to most that the 
government simply cannot replace the private sector in the hous­
ing market.  The regulatory environment needs to reflect this 
new policy awareness and encourage, or at least not discourage, 
private rental housing ownership.98 
97. “Federally assisted housing” includes public-housing projects, Section-8 
tenant-based rent vouchers, as well as housing financed, insured, constructed, and sub­
stantially rehabilitated via federal funding.  42 U.S.C. § 13641(2) (2006).  By statute, 
providers of federally assisted housing are required to screen prospective tenants and 
may reject households where any member is using illegal drugs, abusing alcohol, or is 
engaging in any “criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or 
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.”  42 U.S.C. § 13661; see 
also 24 C.F.R. § 960.203 (2009).  Similarly, federal law provides for the termination of 
assistance where a household member is found to be using drugs or abusing alcohol.  42 
U.S.C. § 13662.  In both screening and termination decisions, what constitutes a disqual­
ifying violation is left to the discretion of the housing provider. Id.  This blanket au­
thority has prompted one public-interest lawyer to warn that the greatest concern for 
advocates representing poor clients is “overzealous officials” barring families with even 
minor criminal histories, despite the absence of a conviction or even an arrest.  John J. 
Ammann, Housing out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 318 (2000).  Fur­
ther, the aggressive implementation of such “One Strike” policies to disqualify federal 
housing applicants has been incentivized by HUD.  Funding bonuses and freedom from 
federal oversight is linked, in part, to the number of applicants a housing authority has 
rejected in accordance with the “One Strike” initiative. See 24 C.F.R. § 902.71 (laying 
out incentives for housing authorities); OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., “ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT” POLICY IN PUBLIC HOUSING 
(attachment to Notice No. 96-16, Apr. 12, 1996), available at http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/adm/hudclips/notices/pih/files/96-16PIHN.doc (exhorting housing authorities to 
aggressively implement “One Strike” criteria in return for performance incentives). 
Compounding the difficulties faced by tenants of federally assisted housing, ex­
isting law also empowers housing providers to disqualify entire households for the acts 
of a single member, even where the family is ignorant of the offending conduct.  42 
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6); see HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (affirming a public-
housing operator’s broad authority to conduct such “no-fault” evictions under the 
statute). 
98. Schloming & Schloming, supra note 12, at 30; see RICHARD  HILTON  & R 
CHARLES HANSON, EVALUATION OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET PROGRAM 1 (2004) (not­
ing that from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s “the Federal Government commit­
ted substantial resources for project-based rental assistance in new or substantially 
rehabilitated multifamily (5 units or more) properties for low- or moderate-income 
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A final important factor contributing to the problem of af­
fordability is that a significant amount of rental housing is being 
demolished or permanently taken out of service; this is particularly 
true in distressed communities where the need for affordable hous­
ing is often the greatest, but rings true in gentrifying communities as 
well.99 
With possible “skimming” of the best tenants by government 
and not-for-profit housing providers, the long-term reduction in 
government-supported housing, and the material reduction in the 
stock of affordable housing, low- and moderate-income families 
who did not get a subsidized apartment have to fend for themselves 
in the private housing market.  As a result of these long-term 
trends, the Joint Center has sought to redirect some of the focus of 
the housing preservation debate from subsidized housing to “the 
families,” and that “[t]hese properties were subsidized through a variety of different 
programs, but they were all provided with long-term subsidies for specific rental units 
owned by private landlords”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 34-37 (charting decrease in R 
federal assistance for affordable housing).  It should be noted that the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit has financed more than two million units of affordable housing 
since 1987. See COMPTROLLER OF THE  CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE  TREASURY, 
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTU­
NITIES FOR  BANKS 1 (2008), available at www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-10a.pdf. 
While this is a great achievement, it does not come close to meeting the need for afford­
able housing. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 59, at 18-37 (summarizing serious af­
fordability and housing condition issues in rental-housing stock).  And despite its many 
successes, the recent economic downturn has destabilized the market for Low-Income 
Housing Tax credits.  Ruth Simon et al., Millions for Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., June 18, 
2008, at C12 (“Demand for tax credits has waned among banks and financial giants 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because they haven’t been registering profits.”).  One 
could argue that a benefit of the Joint Center’s proposal is that, unlike Low-Income 
Housing Tax credits that cannot function well in a contracting economy, the S-REIT 
would continue to operate.  However, outside of a dire recession, this is much less of a 
concern and should not trump considerations of how subsidies perform under more 
normal circumstances. 
99. AMERICA’S  RENTAL  HOUSING: HOMES FOR A  DIVERSE  NATION, supra note 
12, at 22.  The report describes the problem of smaller properties at risk for removal: R 
Over the ten years beginning in 1993, an estimated 2.3 million rental units (6 
percent) were demolished or otherwise permanently removed from the inven­
tory.  Over half of these rentals were in older (built before 1960) one- to four-
family buildings located in the nation’s most distressed neighborhoods . . . . As 
might be expected, loss rates are higher for properties with such additional 
risk factors as low rent, long-term vacancies, and structural deficiencies.  For 
older, smaller multifamily units, these added risk factors push the loss rate to 
13 percent.  Combining all the risk factors, including structural inadequacy, 
pushes the loss rate to over 20 percent. 
Id.  In gentrifying communities, rental housing may be taken out of service in order to 
convert it to condominiums. See generally Hans Lind & Anders Hellstr ̈om, Gentrifica­
tion—An Overview of the Literature (Div. of Bldg. & Real Estate Econ., Working Paper 
No. 38, 2003), available at http://www.kth.se/polopoly_fs/1.19799!38.pdf. 
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fate of the privately owned, unsubsidized rental stock that serves 
the vast majority of low-income renter households.”100  Because fi­
nancing costs are typically the biggest expense for multifamily 
properties, “issues related to the costs and availability of mortgage 
funds have important implications for the overall affordability of 
rental housing.”101 
While the affordability problem is uncontroversial and well 
documented, it is unclear that the best solution for it is to reduce 
the financing costs of these landlords of last resort.  Before under­
taking the Joint Center approach, one must be confident that land­
lords will pass on these savings to their tenants and reverse the 
trend of shrinking the affordable housing stock.  In other words, if 
the benefits of the reduction in landlord financing costs are in­
tended to trickle down to tenants, one should be certain as to its 
rate of flow.102 
James Follain and Edward Szymanoski challenge responses to 
the affordability problem like that of the Joint Center: “[I]t is wise 
to consider the relative importance of multifamily mortgage credit 
subsidy programs in an overall strategy to improve the delivery of 
housing services to low-income households.”103  They argue that, 
for a variety of reasons, “[t]hese subsidy programs should not rank 
very high.”104 
First, they argue that there is insufficient empirical evidence to 
support the argument for supply-side subsidies.105  Second, they ar­
gue that an unacceptable portion of the subsidy flows to the hous­
ing providers and related industries.106  Third, they argue that many 
supply-side subsidies are subject to improper political 
interference.107 
100. AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: HOMES FOR A DIVERSE NATION, supra note 
12, at 21-22 (also noting that this “affordable inventory consists primarily of single-
family and small multifamily units”). 
101. Schnare, supra note 22, at 4. R 
102. Cf. WINNICK, supra note 38, at 172 (noting that indirect government aids for R 
rental housing “must be channeled through the hands of an intermediary—the private 
investor” and that “[c]onstant vigilance and strict regulation are required to insure that 
benefits will not be absorbed before they reach the intended beneficiary”). 
103. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 173. R 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 174. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (arguing that “[d]emand-side programs are less prone to this type of 
abuse in competitive markets for rental housing, which seems to be the typical 
situation”). 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\31-3\WNE315.txt unknown Seq: 26  7-JUN-10 7:30 
2009] LANDLORDS OF LAST RESORT 939 
Follain clearly outlines the argument against a “trickle down,” 
supply-side subsidized multifamily mortgage policy, based on a fun­
damental question: what is the price elasticity of the housing sup­
ply?108  If the housing supply is elastic, then tenants may benefit 
from reductions in the cost of providing the housing.109  But if it is 
inelastic, “the primary beneficiaries of such programs are likely to 
be builders, investors, and other supply-side agents.”110  This is be­
cause reducing production costs for an inelastic supply should not 
result in price reductions—only an elastic and increasing supply 
would have such a result.111  As the housing economics literature 
has not yet determined whether the housing supply is elastic, it is 
dangerous to implement public policy based on the assumption that 
it is.112 
After noting the limitations inherent in such supply-side, 
trickle-down policies, Follain and Szymanoski close their argument 
by pointing to the existence of more efficient solutions to some of 
the problems that a mortgage finance subsidy is intended to ad­
dress.113  One such solution, for instance, would be to pursue poli­
cies that directly benefit low- and moderate-income households and 
are targeted to reduce housing costs for tenants.  Section 8, tenant­
108. Follain, supra note 10, at 543. R 
109. Elasticity of housing supply depends in turn on a variety of local factors, 
including rent, zoning, land use, and building regulations. 
110. Follain, supra note 10, at 544.  See EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH 
GYOURKO, RETHINKING  FEDERAL  HOUSING  POLICY 64-81 (2008), for a discussion of 
the extreme variability of elasticity among American housing submarkets that results 
from variations in local land use regulation. 
111. For example, if housing supply is elastic, developers would build more hous­
ing if it became profitable to do so as a result of decreased financing costs.  This is 
because financing costs are a major element of overall housing cost. 
112. Follain, supra note 10, at 544.  Of course there is a certain amount of waste 
in any subsidy that does not involve a direct income transfer.  If one were only choosing 
among producer subsidies, one must compare their comparative inefficiencies. 
113. Id.  Follain and Szymanoski suggest that 
the complexity of multifamily lending can be reduced by simplifying the rules 
and regulations surrounding nonprofit housing development organizations. 
Local governments can also be encouraged to develop housing codes that are 
more accommodating to projects for low-income households. Another idea 
usually favored by economists is a well-structured demand-side voucher pro­
gram that encourages recipients to search the market for good and affordable 
housing. This type of subsidy program is usually simpler to implement than 
subsidized lending programs and is more likely to be successful. 
Id.; see Ellickson, supra note 94 (comparing efficacy of vouchers to inclusionary R 
programs). 
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based rent vouchers are the most well known of such subsidies.114 
One could achieve similar results by providing a tax credit for rent 
payments by low- and moderate-income families.  Ultimately, the 
concerns set forth by Follain and Szymanoski regarding multifamily 
mortgage subsidy programs in general must be addressed before a 
federal or state government should implement a new program of 
subsidized, multifamily mortgage finance for small buildings in 
particular. 
B. The Market Failure Rationale 
Follain and Szymanoski also explore “market failure” as an al­
ternate rationale for government intervention in the multifamily 
mortgage sector.115  In particular, they note that 
[i]t is difficult to make a case for government intervention in the 
multifamily mortgage market when using the standard model of 
market failure, given the efficiencies of modern financial mar­
kets.  The case for intervention in the financial markets, if one is 
to be made, is more subtle and requires a model in which uncer­
tainty about some future events—for example, mortgage de­
faults—is explicit.  Market failure in models with uncertainty is 
caused by two broad categories of factors in the credit markets: 
uninsurable risks and information costs.116 
The question, then, is whether the small multifamily mortgage 
market suffers from uncertainty because of uninsurable risks or in­
114. See generally RICHARD  HILTON ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE  MARK-TO­
MARKET  PROGRAM 1 (2004), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/ 
M2MEva.pdf.  The authors note, 
In 1974, Congress enacted Section 8 “Lower Income Rental Assistance” under 
the United States Housing Act, a program that could be either project-based 
or tenant-based. Rather than providing a fixed subsidy, tenants would gener­
ally pay 25 percent of their income (later increased to 30 percent) towards 
their rent and the government would pay the difference. 
Id. 
115. Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 154.  The authors describe a market R 
failure as follows: 
[W]hen the market does not provide the quantity of a particular good or ser­
vice at which the marginal social benefits of another unit equal the marginal 
social costs of producing that unit.  In such a situation, the benefits to society 
of having one more unit exceed the costs of producing one more unit; thus, a 
rationale exists for some level of government to intervene in the market and 
expand the output of this good. 
Id. 
116. Id.; see Vandell, supra note 10, at 322 (arguing that the most compelling R 
argument “for government involvement in multifamily finance comes by way overcom­
ing information voids”). 
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formation costs.  While researchers in the 1980s and 1990s found 
that there was not enough information for multifamily mortgage 
underwriters to make informed decisions,117 this seems to be much 
less the case today.118  To the extent that there is a market failure in 
the multifamily mortgage market, it is caused in part by the large 
number of originators in the small multifamily submarket.  Such a 
low-concentration market increases transaction costs for secondary 
market investors seeking to conduct due diligence on many mort­
gages with different terms.  As opposed to the RMBS market, there 
is a great deal of variety in multifamily mortgage documents, which 
increases due diligence and legal review costs for underwriters and 
securitizers.119 
A final question is, if one were to generally support multi­
family mortgage subsidies, whether smaller multifamily buildings 
should be subsidized at the expense of larger buildings.  This is an 
important issue in the debate over whether to provide new supports 
for this housing stock, as smaller multifamily buildings may be less 
117. See, e.g., Amy D. Crews et al., The Distribution of Multifamily Mortgage 
Originations: What We Know and Why We Care, 6 J. HOUSING ECON. 334, 365 (1997) 
(“Without better information, further development of a secondary multifamily mort­
gage market is likely to go slowly and lag far behind the single-family mortgage mar­
ket.”); Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 49-50 (“[R]esearch indicates that small R 
projects make up a niche market that is difficult and uneconomical to serve through 
standard multifamily lending practices.”). 
118. AMERICA’S  RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POL­
ICY, supra note 3, at 14. R 
119. See, e.g., Schneider & Follain, supra note 52, at 50.  The authors note, R 
The costs to investors of due diligence on nonstandardized loan pools of small 
project mortgages eliminate many pricing advantages of a structured transac­
tion.  Efforts to increase standardization could secure more access to efficient 
sources of long-term capital.  However, standardization may prove difficult to 
accomplish because of the heterogeneity of small project borrowers and the 
flexibility required to underwrite small project loans. 
Id.; see also Jean L. Cummings, Developing a Secondary Market for Affordable Rental 
Housing: Lessons from the LIMAC/Freddie Mac and EMI/Fannie Mae Programs, 4 CI­
TYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 19, 20 (1998) (“An active secondary market requires 
standardization of the mortgage contract, underwriting and mortgage documents”).  In 
January 2009, the Joint Center made a related market failure argument—that private 
lenders exit the multifamily market during credit crises and government instrumentali­
ties such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are needed to provide liquidity. MEETING 
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS, supra note 2, at 5.  Given the problems faced R 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the current credit crisis, this argument is less 
than compelling. See David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Fed­
eral Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. (forth­
coming 2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/david_reiss/25. 
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efficient providers of affordable housing than larger ones.120  To an­
swer that question, one should compare the cost of subsidizing a 
unit of a small multifamily building to prevent it from being taken 
out of service to the cost of subsidizing a unit of a large multifamily 
building to prevent it from being taken out of service.  In all likeli­
hood, it is more efficient to preserve the unit in the larger build­
ing.121  After all, large buildings bring to bear an economy of scale 
120. William Apgar and Shekar Narasimhan argue that the smaller units in par­
ticular should be preserved.  For example: 
With new construction focused on expanding the supply of more expensive 
apartments in large multifamily structures, the ongoing demolition and inven­
tory losses of rental units in older small multifamily structures is rapidly de­
pleting the available supply of affordable rental housing.  Most of the 
privately-owned small multifamily rental stock was built at least 30 years ago 
when construction techniques and capital markets were less sophisticated and 
households were less affluent.  Much of this inventory is now in need of sub­
stantial repair.  According to the American Housing Survey, 3 million private 
market rental units have severe structural deficiencies and are at risk of loss. 
APGAR & NARASIMHAN, supra note 1, at 6.  In addition to the criticisms set forth in the R 
text above, Apgar and Narasimhan fail to explicitly address the filtering process that 
occurs as newer, more expensive units are added to the existing housing stock and the 
extent to which that addition to the overall housing supply offsets inventory losses of 
older, small multifamily units. See Matthew Edel, Filtering in a Private Housing Mar­
ket, in READINGS IN  URBAN  ECONOMICS 204, 204 (Matthew Edel & Jerome Rothen­
berg eds., 1972) (defining filtering).  They also fail to account for the fact that 
developments in the housing finance market such as the FHA–insured mortgage have 
allowed “the average developer to build on a larger scale.” WINNICK, supra note 38, at R 
159. 
121. In order to study whether smaller buildings are less efficient tools for pre­
serving affordable housing, one would need to control for the quality of the housing 
provided by smaller and larger buildings.  Once that is done, it is very likely that the 
finding would be that larger buildings are more efficient. See THE STATE OF THE NA­
TION’S HOUSING (2006), supra note 9, at 22 (noting that over the 1990s and 2000s “new R 
multifamily rental construction has shifted decidedly toward larger structures”).  A fur­
ther consideration is whether lower-density housing has positive externalities that 
should factor into any discussion of subsidizing small apartment buildings.  This appears 
to be a largely unexplored area of study.  There have been numerous studies, however, 
that evaluate the individual and community benefits of residential homeownership, as 
compared to rental tenancy. See, e.g., ROBERT D. DIETZ, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF HOMEOWNERSHIP (Homeownership Alliance, 2003), available at www.newtowncdc. 
org/pdf/social_consequences_study.pdf (surveying existing scholarship drawn from so­
cial sciences, medicine, psychology, and other academic fields).  Additionally, there is 
scholarship comparing the economic and health outcomes of moving families from 
high-poverty neighborhoods to low-poverty areas. See Jeffrey Kling et al., Moving to 
Opportunity and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufficiency 
and Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment 4-5 (Harvard Univ. John 
F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP04-035, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=588942 (finding significant mental health benefits, 
some physical benefits, and no substantial economic benefits from participation in hous­
ing mobility program).  It remains, however, a completely open question whether hous­
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that will tend to make them run more efficiently.122  In either case, 
however, if the housing supply is relatively inelastic it is unlikely 
that even a generally available subsidy for multifamily properties is 
an efficient way to reduce the rate of loss to the affordable multi­
family housing supply.123  The imposition of some form of rent reg­
ulation on the subsidized housing would be necessary to ensure that 
it remained affordable.124 
Apgar and Narasimhan have given form to the repeated calls 
by housing advocates to subsidize financing costs for small apart­
ment buildings.  To give this proposal its due, it does attempt to 
address aspects of the efficiency argument.  To that end, Apgar and 
Narasimhan argue that the proposal would “facilitate the ownership 
transfer of the critically important small-multifamily rental inven­
tory from individual owner to institutional investor, and in doing so 
help gain needed scale economies to reduce the costs of property 
management, repair and maintenance.”125  It is highly uncertain, 
however, whether the economies of scale contemplated by such a 
model would in fact be achieved: one private company that be­
ing density alone, controlling for all other factors, has an impact on residents sufficient 
to prioritize subsidies for small apartment buildings over those for larger buildings. 
122. See MEETING  MULTIFAMILY  HOUSING  FINANCE  NEEDS, supra note 2, at 2 R 
(citing efficiencies in delivering social services, improving physical infrastructure, and 
achieving energy independence and sustainable development goals via multifamily 
communities versus single-family housing).  It is reasonable to assume that such effi­
ciencies would be amplified, to some degree, in larger-scale multifamily housing.  Apgar 
and Narasimhan readily admit that “[a]vailable evidence suggests the presence of signif­
icant economies of scale in the operation of larger buildings.”  Apgar & Narasimhan, 
supra note 1, at 22.  Indeed, the heart of their proposal is to duplicate the efficiencies of R 
larger buildings by pooling smaller properties. Id. at 21-24, 28.  However, as argued 
above, there are more efficient means of promoting the overarching goal of affordable 
housing. 
123. Notwithstanding this concern about the small multifamily market, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude, along with James Follain and Edward Szymanoski, that 
“standard contracts and data systems are public goods and government may want to 
invest in their development.”  Follain & Szymanoski, supra note 33, at 161.  Such an R 
investment would obviously be much more modest than an ongoing subsidy to land­
lords themselves. 
124. To be clear, Apgar and Narasimhan’s S-REIT proposal does not call for 
mandatory subsidized rents or tenant income limits on the units owned by the S-REIT. 
While writing that affordability could be enhanced by combining the S-REIT program 
with rental subsidies, at base the program relies on market mechanisms to preserve 
affordable housing: “Even without subsidy, the [S-REIT] approach would help stem the 
loss of many small multifamily properties.  In doing [so,] it alleviates the ongoing pres­
sure on market rents that undermine the well being of the nation’s lowest income rent­
ers.”  Apgar & Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 27. R 
125. Apgar, supra note 90, at 55. R 
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lieved that it could achieve such economies of scale has found that 
it is much more difficult than it had foreseen.126 
CONCLUSION 
While it is incontrovertible that small-apartment-building own­
ers are not all slumlords and social parasites, the argument in favor 
of subsidizing the financing costs for such property owners has not 
been won.  At best, its proponents might argue that it is a realpoli­
tik response to the fact that direct subsidies to the poor are politi­
cally impractical, so it is better to support an industry—the housing 
industry—that provides services to the poor and is organized 
enough to defend those subsidies.127 
For a more principled defense, proponents of small-apartment­
building subsidy programs will need to respond to the concerns out­
lined above: is it a relatively efficient subsidy?  Is it responding to a 
market failure?  Those who favor such subsidies appear to have suc­
cumbed to a logical fallacy: they argue that because small buildings 
provide affordable housing and are at risk of loss, the most efficient 
way to protect affordable housing is to preserve these small build­
ings.  For the reasons outlined above, that conclusion does not fol­
low: the indiscriminate subsidy of financing costs for the owners of 
small multifamily buildings has not been demonstrated to be good 
public policy.  More carefully targeted uses of government subsidies 
are therefore warranted to achieve housing affordability for low-
and moderate-income households. 
126. See James R. Hagerty, Beware the Foreclosure Allure—Redbrick’s Model of 
Scattered Bets Is Cautionary Tale, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at C19 (noting that pri­
vate-sector investor in scattered small apartment buildings did not achieve economies 
of scale but, rather, faced high costs). 
127. Ellickson, supra note 94, at 30-31. R 
